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STUDYING CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE AND POLICY
A SPEECH GIVEN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
RICHMOND, SCHOOL OF LAW ON
NOVEMBER 9,2007
William B. Brown
Professorial Lecturer, George Washington University
Chinese international finance may sound to many of you like a
daunting subject. It really is not, but I have to admit it's not quite
intuitive. International finance is a lot like accounting; you have to
learn the rules. And on top of that, in this case we have to add the
never intuitive issue of Chinese policy-making. I didn't learn anything
about these topics in graduate school but rather in my first job as a
CIA economist, over thirty years ago. At that time China published no
economic data; it was just sort of a black hole in the world of data. My
first assignment was to work with other economists and create an esti-
mate of China's balance of payments accounts using something of a
mirror image approach. We could do that because most of the coun-
tries that China dealt with did report their transactions with China.
Since, for example, U.S. exports to China in theory equal Chinese im-
ports from the United States, we could construct China's accounts us-
ing partner data. And if we had most of the partners, we could make a
reasonably accurate approximation of their balance of payments. It
was kind of a fun puzzle and one that, though complicated, was quite
capable of being solved. When China did eventually publish its data,
our estimates proved reasonably accurate. Ever since that first job, I
have really liked looking at China's balance of payments.
The big news story we hear these days is the huge increase of
China's foreign reserves-the dollar, yen, or euro holdings of the Peo-
ple's Bank of China. In fact just this week there is a story out that
China is considering selling some of its huge hoard of dollars since the
dollar has been weak. Yes, the Chinese central bankers might not be
happy with a declining dollar but what happens if they sell their dol-
lars and buy, say euros?
If you are a really big player, like the Chinese bank is, you
drive down the price of the thing you are trying to sell and drive up the
price of what you are going to buy. So maybe that's not such a good
idea. To a degree, then, they are trapped with what they've got. Now,
is that a good thing for China or the United States or a bad thing? As
most economists will tell you, it usually doesn't make sense in econom-
ics to say something is good or bad for a whole country. But what hap-
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  149 2008
150 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 7:2
pens does have important implications for different types of people in
both countries. There will be winners and losers in both countries if
the Chinese take action. So lets take a closer look at this from the
perspective of the balance of payments data and the value of RMB, the
name of China's currency.
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Figure 1: China Balance of Payments
Figure 1 includes China's balance of payments for 2005 and
2006. China now publishes such data on the web so we no longer have
to estimate it. What we have in a balance of payments table is a cur-
rent account side, which is basically an expanded view of the goods
and services trade, and a financial account side, which shows the
money flows related to the balance of such trade and to investment
flows into and out of a country. We all know China has a big goods
trade surplus, so they have a positive flow of money coming in on the
current account side. Usually, that is in most economies, an inflow on
the current side is balanced by an outflow on the finance side as the
money earned is sent abroad to earn interest and profits. The foreign
exchange reserves figure is the balancing item between the two ac-
counts since any hard currency not sent abroad is captured by the cen-
tral bank, which uses it to purchase interest-bearing securities of other
central banks. In the financial account this is listed as a negative-in
other words, the negative shown above on the reserves is really what
the central bank is spending in order to purchase reserves. It's not
quite intuitive, but just think of the central bank using its cash to buy
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  150 2008
CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL FINANCE POLICY
gold and treasury securities. So the negative is an outflow of money
but a buildup of reserves.
China is not a usual country; however, as we can see, especially
in 2005, it ran large surpluses on both the current and financial ac-
count sides, followed in 2006 with an even larger current account sur-
plus and a small financial account surplus. So in addition to earning a
lot from exports, China was borrowing a lot for investment purposes,
and was a huge recipient of foreign direct investment. This then nets
out to an incredible excess of foreign exchange, which flows from Chi-
nese firms and agencies into the central bank, which promptly spends
it to purchase foreign securities, thus raising its level of reserves. This
is the number that everybody throws around as a very scary thing-
about $300 billion in each year. For two reasons I'll get to below, I'm
not so worried about these numbers but there is no doubt they are very
large.
First let's compare the U.S. and Chinese balance of payments
tables for 2006 as shown in Figure Two, importantly on the same
scale. We can see here that the US runs a huge deficit on its current
account and that is offset by a huge surplus on the financial account,
so the impact on reserves is not so great. In effect, foreigners are lend-
ing us the money to pay for our imports and in doing so are helping
keep our interest rates low and our economy growing strongly. Im-
ports are helping to keep inflation down and our standard of living
high. China is quite the opposite in this respect, but the levels as com-
pared to the US are still quite low.
Second, lets look at the cumulative impact of these balance of
payment flows. These are shown in Figure 3 as China's stock of assets
and liabilities for 2005 and 2006.
You can see that China has about $1.3-1.6 trillion in assets and
about $1.0 trillion in liabilities with a net of between $300 billion and
$600 billion, growing at about $300 billion a year as can be seen from
the balance of payments table. The liabilities shown are foreign in-
vestments in China and are dominated by foreign direct investment-
lets say IBM and Motorola factories in China. The assets, in contrast,
are completely dominated by central bank reserves. The point I'd like
to make is the relative absence of private or non-central bank foreign
assets. China's government still maintains extensive capital controls
that prevent its citizens and many of its institutions from engaging in
international finance, hence all foreign exchange earnings that are not
spent on imports are captured by the central bank. These then are
used to purchase foreign government securities. If you were to look at
similar data for an OECD country like the U.S. that does not limit its
citizen's foreign activities, you would find much larger amounts of for-
eign assets owned by private citizens and private institutions, such as
insurance companies, and much less foreign exchange owned by the
20081
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Figure 2: US/China Balance of Payments 2006
central bank. So the bottom line is clear; China's central bank foreign
exchange reserves are large but such reserves for the country as a
whole are not.
China Stock of Assets, Liabilities 2005-06
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Figure 3: China Stock of Assets, Liabilities, 2005-06
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With a better understanding of these facts let's return to this
week's news story that China is going to sell its dollars since it is un-
happy with the return it is getting. What this would mean is that the
central bank would sell some of its huge stock of treasury securities
and use the money to a) import something or b) buy Euro or Japanese
securities. If you were China you would have the same feeling. When
the Chinese government buys U.S. treasuries, it gets a return of four
percent or five percent per year even as the dollar's value slips about
that much each year. Meanwhile, the return on capital in China is
probably ten or twenty percent per year, so, if the funds were invested
in China, they would be doing much better. How can the central bank
afford to do this, borrow at ten to twenty percent and lend at four per-
cent? The truth is they don't allow Chinese savers to earn as much as
they could on an open market. The Chinese people save a huge
amount of their relatively small incomes and those savings flow into
the central bank, which then controls all investment. Largely as an
outgrowth of their Communist system, the government does not want
private savers to be able to channel investment into the most profita-
ble areas, so they control all investment quite tightly. The result is the
whole system generates very little return on investment and far too
much money ends up with the central bank. Maybe it's a bit inten-
tional, given the Communist ideology that still frowns somewhat on
high returns on capital; but the problem is they can't have it both
ways-they can't have a market economy for goods, services and labor
and a controlled economy for capital.
Let me give you an example of a kind of problem that is devel-
oping in this mixed system. On Monday, you may have read the story
in the Wall Street Journal where PetroChina (China's biggest oil com-
pany - mostly owned by the state) launched an IPO in Shanghai, sell-
ing to any Chinese person shares that already were on sale in Hong
Kong to international investors. The price in Hong Kong had been
about $2.50 a share. The price started at about the Hong Kong price
but by the end of the day the price had gone up four times. I've forgot-
ten the actual dollar price, but it went up to something like ten dollars
per share. The funny thing is the Hong Kong shares didn't go up, so
you have the same share priced four times more in Shanghai (for Chi-
nese people) than in Hong Kong (for everyone else). This gap tells you
there are a lot of restraints on such trades. At that ten dollars per
share rate, this company was valued at more than Exxon Mobile and
was by far the biggest company in the world as measured by stock
prices times stock outstanding. There are some significant oil fields in
China to be sure but compared with Exxon-Mobile you have to wonder.
The reason for such overvaluation and low returns in China is
that, in its highly compartmented system, Chinese savers don't have
much of an outlet for their savings. They can either put savings in the
2008]
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monopolized bank system and earn a low or even negative real interest
rate, or they buy speculative stocks that seem to go up and up. So,
bank savings start flowing into the stock market, and that just pushes
up the price at an incredibly fast rate. I have no doubt China now has
built up a big financial bubble, with a stock market that has doubled in
the past three or four months. I think they are staring in the face a
real crisis in their capital markets looking at the way stock prices have
shot up. An early sign of this is inflation-the inflation rate is rising
rapidly and shot up to six percent in September.
What's the impact of all this for China and for us? As I see it,
there are two different ways they can go. A high inflation, high growth
policy spurred on by this over-investment boom economy, led by a
weak currency and low interest rates. Inflation ultimately will raise
their RMB costs to the point that the exchange rate will be about
right-it will make their exports more expensive and imports rela-
tively cheaper and thus will rebalance their current account. I think
most economists would argue they can fix the problem in a better way
by raising interest rates even though it might pop the investment bub-
ble. The problem is they should have done this a while back. The
longer they wait, the more likely this bubble is to keep expanding, as it
has been expanding rapidly even in the last week, and the bigger the
pop.
Central Bank Chasing Inflation?
China: Deposit Rates and Inflation:
Jan 2005-Nov 2007
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Figure 4: China's Deposit Rates and Inflation, Jan. 2005-Nov. 2007
I do think they've waited too long to liberalize their capital
markets and allow domestic interest rates to find their right level. I
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Figure 5: Chinest Yuan per U.S. dollar
argue they are doing the right things, but they're doing them too
slowly and are inviting a big financial crisis. If we look at Figures 4
and 5 we can see that they are raising interest rates-though they are
not keeping up with inflation-and they are allowing the dollar to fall
in value against RMB. I'm not necessarily predicting a crisis, but they
really need to speed up interest rate increases and RMB appreciation.
Allowing the currency to appreciate lowers import prices and reduces
exports, so that helps with inflation. Raising interest rates gives sav-
ers more income and prevents too much investment spending that in-
evitably will reduce profits and lead to an investment bust.
Ultimately, I'm pretty confident that, ten years from now, instead of
this 7.4 yuan per dollar rate we see now, it will be three or four yuan
per dollar and we'll all be saying, "boy, I wish I had bought Chinese
money then when it was so cheap." That is what is happened in Japan
in the 1950s and 1960s and it seems to me the same thing is happen-
ing in China. In the mean time, China may have to live through a big
financial crisis much like occurred in Japan and later, in South Korea.
The implications of this on U.S. industry, of course, are impor-
tant also, and I've listed some of these in Figure 6. The cheap yuan
pushes a lot of investment into China and is helping it build an incred-
ible manufacturing industry that is going to affect the world for a long
time. Again, we needn't think this is necessarily good or bad; there are
a lot of positive things for us. As China becomes more export oriented,
as happened in Japan, they start becoming more import oriented as
well. Today, U.S. trade data just came out for the first three quarters;
Is RMB Undervalued?
" US dollar dips 5.5% last 12 months, down 7.8% in 24 months
" But market rate is still more than twice PPP rate.
Chinese Yuan per US dollar
Jan 2004 - Nov 2007
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US Implications
" Private Sector
r Look for 4/1 RMB opportunities
" Export to China
" Richer Chinese-tourists etc.
" Worried Chinese-financial services
u But watch out for investment bubble/bust
o Chinese RMB assets (dollar value doubles with 4/1 but
Chinese value falls 80 percent in financial bust)
o Public Sector
u Emphasize capital market Improvement, not exchange rate
o Deposit rate increase, eliminate policy loans
" RMB bond sales
o Raising corporate stock supply, retiring bank loans
Say no to protectionism as long as Chinese policy is in right
direction (yes) and at right speed (not sure).
Figure 6: U.S. Implications
I looked at it on the way down. U.S. exports to China are up a strong
twenty percent in the last year. As China creates this booming export
oriented economy, they're going to start sucking in goods and services.
As inflation kicks in they will need more imports to dampen price in-
creases and improve productivity. Firms that are ready to take advan-
tage of that are going to make a lot of money in the next twenty years'
time - but they will need to have a lot of guts as they will have to
weather a financial crisis in the middle of this. Maybe I should stop
there and take some questions. My bottom line is that this is a really
interesting but difficult and complicated issue, but it's well worth your
paying attention to. Select some aspects of the issue and start study-
ing it and before long you will be an expert.
Question: Do you think if they raise interest rates they will still keep
their currency valued at what it is - 7.8 to the dollar, or whatever it is
right now?
Answer: I don't think so. One thing, it's not pegged right now; they
are allowing it to increase, although relatively slowly. They use a bas-
ket approach with the dollar as a very heavy weight in the basket. So
if the dollar declines against the Euro, yuan also declines against
Euro. And the whole basket can rise or fall against yuan, although
only very slightly any given day. They need to raise interest rates just
to keep up with their inflation. Allowing appreciation also would help
them fight inflation. If they don't raise interest rates, inflation will
almost surely kick up to a faster rate.
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Question: They have a controlled economy so is it easier for them to
raise interest rates or the exchange rate?
Answer: A good question, but it's not clear to me that it's easier for
them to do one or the other. What I'm thinking is that their interest
rates need to be above the rate of inflation. Especially their bank de-
posit rates so that savers earn a positive real return. Certainly, the
rule of thumb is that the interest rates should be above the regular
inflation. Their inflation right now is about six percent so that would
be moving the interest rates from about two percent to seven percent.
Wow, that would be a huge shock to their system. I don't know if their
banks could handle that. I think I would argue that they need to be
moving towards a floating exchange rate, in tandem with raising inter-
est rates. Raising interest rates protects them from an outflow
account.
Another issue is whether their currency really is overvalued.
I'm two-sided about it. Considering what they pay for labor, on what
goods cost, on anything you buy in China, RMB or yuan looks very
undervalued; it looks way too cheap. But with respect to what Chinese
can earn on the money, it looks very expensive. Doesn't buy very much
PetroChina stock, for example. So, when the Chinese say, "no, we don't
want to float the currency," they are worried about an outflow of funds
on the financial account; for instance a lot of Chinese making portfolio
investments abroad. So there is a two-sided aspect to this they have to
try to balance. I guess my answer, though, is just doing one without
the other won't work, they have to work on both at the same time.
Question: I just thought capital controls could prevent the loss that...
Answer: The interesting thing about capital controls is they work if
you are a very strong government, you can prevent arbitrage between
internal rates and foreign rates but the incentives to cheat the system
are huge and corruption easily can become rampant. I'm pretty sure
somebody is able to buy, for instance, those PetroChina shares in Hong
Kong for $2.50 and sell them in Shanghai for $10.00, and earn a mil-
lion dollars in a day. Whoever controls that... well, there is a lot of
corruption in China because of that. Corruption is like punching holes
in this wall of capital controls and I think there are so many holes in
this wall right now that the controls sooner or later will completely fall
apart.
Question: Is it possible for a foreigner to collect property in China?
Answer: Not directly, but obviously Chinese own things, so you can
work with Chinese; maybe work out a deal with the Chinese. This is
where the wall is springing all these holes. US banks are buying into
Chinese banks in a big way. US companies are able to buy into Chi-
nese companies more and more; this is why the FDI inflow is so large
and is partly why PetroChina soared-I expect there is some US
20081
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money in it. Still you, as a U.S. citizen, cannot go in and buy property
in China, but you can get a lease, and may get a really long-term lease,
which is just about as good. Certainly you can buy Chinese shares in
Hong Kong. I'm thinking right now that PetroChina is a good buy in
Hong Kong and a bad buy in Shanghai. The bottom line is that with
this volatility, there are lots of opportunities and risks.
Question: You mentioned the ideology of the Chinese government ver-
sus these capital controls - do you see the capital controls as letting
them lead to the collapse of this Communist ideology over there more
so than in the past?
Answer: The ideology, I think, has already collapsed. I say that be-
cause I gave a similar briefing with a group of Chinese officials at the
Commerce Department a couple of years ago, telling them I though
they should raise interest rates, etc. and said I understood the diffi-
culty that the Communist Party had in raising interest rates since
that, as Marx said, might make the rich richer and the poor poorer. A
gentleman came up after my presentation, a Chinese official, and gave
me his calling card, "Chairman of the Communist Party" of some large
city. He said "Mr. Brown, you don't understand, we are not Commu-
nists anymore, at least Communists in the way you describe it." Com-
munism is really only the party's name. It is easy to forget, however,
that the state still owns most of the land and real property. Again, I
think this is a really big opportunity. I would guess one of the biggest
opportunities for those of you in the law field in China would be help-
ing them work with securities laws and helping them privatize public
property. Their state enterprises and banks are in bad financial shape
with huge bad loans. They are illiquid but probably are not insolvent
since they own lots of real estate they can't sell. What they really need
is a huge shift in property in China from the public sector to the pri-
vate sector. They know that, but it is a legal minefield doing that.
I don't want to blame them because I think they have made
such progress over twenty-five years moving in the right direction
without creating another revolution, and we should commend them for
that. Again, my main issue is whether or not they going fast enough
with liberalizing their capital markets. That's where pressure needs
to be. We should keep pressure on them to be fixing these capital mar-
kets, stock markets, bond markets, and cleaning up bad loans so that
they can open up their capital markets to international competition.
That would be good for Chinese savers and good for American produc-
ers. In those circumstances I think both their and our balance of pay-
ments will become more "balanced."
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